Abstract. Th e article focuses on the human individual as a signifying and communicating self whose properties can be detected or assumed on the basis of its language in verbal communication through texts and text-processing activities or, more broadly, in both verbal and non-verbal communication through signs and sign-processing activities in the semiotics of culture. Th e point of departure is the distinction between the observable self and the inferable self, i.e., a concrete person who transmits and receives verbal and/or non-verbal messages, and a mental subject who is engaged in creating and comprehending them. As a consequence of this distinction, it can be stated that the communicative network of the human life-world consists of two types of collectivities. On the one hand, there are speakers and listeners of particular languages who form interpersonal collectivities of those transmitting and receiving perceivable meaning bearers through physical-acoustic sound waves in the communication channel; on the other hand, there are intersubjective collectivities of those who process and understand intelligible meaning bearers while referring them to an extra-linguistic reality through acts of reasoning and interpreting. Exposing the notion of polyglotism, this paper argues that a multiaspectual typology of selves is possible on the basis of the linguistic and cultural texts that characterize the social roles and pragmatic goals of communication participants in the various domains of the human life-world. Finally, it supports the conviction that interdependencies between language and culture must be primarily explained in terms of psychological, or rather, psycho-semiotic conditionings of humans. Since particular languages are products and components of social and cultural life, constantly being shaped and changed due to personal and subjective activities of human selves, polyglotism as both multilingualism and multiculturalism also implies an inquiry into their multicultural competence and multicultural identity.
From language to linguistic properties of signifying and communicating selves
In conformity with the "humanistic turn" of the post-structuralist period of the 1960s, we can now speak of the need to study human individuals as signifying and communicating selves whose properties can be detected or assumed on the basis of textual products and text-processing activities. In contrast to the "linguistic turn" of the fi rst half of the 20th century, the attention of researchers has shift ed from language regarded as a tool of communication to the linguistic properties of speaking and/or listening individuals as members of speech collectivities or communicative collectivities broadly understood. Th us, an approach to human individuals as communicators when they are treated both as (1) observable selves, engaged as persons in the processes of transmitting and receiving verbal signs; and (2) inferable selves occupied as mental subjects with signproduction and sign-comprehension activities corresponds to the viewpoint adopted by representatives of linguistic and semiotic studies in the post-structuralist period dealing with humans as participants in communication. For practical reasons, researchers must take into account the distinction between the physical domain based on experiment and objective observation and the logical domain based on communication and subjective inference, formulated by Victor Huse Yngve, an American physicist and linguist, in his book From Grammar to Science from 1996. Th ese domains belong, respectively, to the so-called "hard sciences" which rely on empirical evidence and to the "soft sciences" which depend upon rational thinking.
With reference to Yngve (1996: 93-106) , some statements pertaining to signifi cative and communicative properties of humans can be formulated. Firstly, observable and/or inferable semiotic properties of the signifying and communicating self are investigated in the so-called physical domain and/or in the logical domain. Secondly, speakers and listeners who engage in communication in (a) given language(s) form collectivities of two types. Th e fi rst type comprises interpersonal collectivities of those who transmit and receive sensible bearers of meaning (which are observable, similarly to properties of human communicators, in the physical domain and describable in appropriate terms); and the second type includes intersubjective collectivities of those who understand or interpret the intelligible meaning bearers referring them to extra-linguistic reality (which are assumable in the logical domain). Following this approach, it has to be stressed that the properties of communicating individuals as members of interpersonal and intersubjective collectivities belong, on the one hand, to the investigative domain of the hard sciences, i.e., physics, chemistry, and biology, or, on the other hand, constitute the subject matter of the so-called soft sciences such as linguistics, psychology, sociology, logic, and philosophy. Additionally, what is not at all insignifi cant is the statement that the everyday reality of humans is a social construct resulting from the typical contents of communication among members of societies and social groups.
Dimensions of the concept of human self
In substantiating the need to associate the concept of human self to human communicative performances, Susan Petrilli's studies on the self (i.e., human being) as a sign (Petrilli 2013: 29, 59, 147; cf. also Petrilli 1988 cf. also Petrilli , 1990 cf. also Petrilli , 1998 should be borne in mind. Petrilli departs from Charles Sanders Peirce whose focus is on the self/sign in becoming in open-ended semiosic and semiotic processes (cf. CP). Also Norbert Wiley (1994) or John Pickering (1999) who have been dealing with the human self in terms of semiotic processes should be mentioned here. Th e notion of the self has been elaborated in philosophy and psychology, and applied in communicology. From the point of view of the present author, works of scholars such as William James, George Herbert Mead as well as Edmund Husserl are of vital importance here (cf. James 1890 James , 2001 James [1892 ; Mead 1913 Mead , 1934 Husserl 1970 Husserl [1956 ).
Nowadays, the concept of the human self appears to be essential for the domain of linguistic studies, whenever issues of meaning and understanding are under consideration. Its application presupposes the statement that each speaking or communicating individual is both an exceptional and irreplaceable experiencing subject as well as an object of his or her own experience which may be characterized in terms of individual motivation, emotions, and beliefs. If the aim is to estimate the reliability of data coming from discourse studies oriented toward individual expression with reference to individual consciousness, it is indispensable to investigate what the notion of the self connotes with regard to the psychological dimension of human consciousness and mental processes, subjective experiencing of human sensations, feelings and emotions, and reasoning an individual is able to conduct. Th ere is a need, then, to realize that mental processes taking place within the mind of an individual, which involve verbal signs, proceed with or without participation of consciousness.
Referring to James 1890; 2001 [1892 and Mead 1934 , one has to suppose that thinking processes of an individual are streams of thoughts, internal intellectual procedures, internal conversations or interactions in which the I (i.e., the self as a subject) responds to the Me (i.e., the self as an object). Th ese processes refl ect mental experiences of individuals, their encounters within a society, and thus processes within a society. It should be added that it was James (cf., e.g., 2001: 43-83 ) who focused on two aspects of the self: (1) the self as an object that is known, or the Me; and (2) the self as a subjective knower, or the I; and who subsequently distinguished three components of the self as an object -the material, the social and the spiritual selves. James' ascertainments pertaining to the self must be recognized as still valid and useful; however, the line of his reasoning about the existence mode of the self was, in spite of all, one of the distinguishing characteristics of the philosophy of St. Augustine and his followers, as demonstrated, for example, by Marguerite Witmer Kehr in her article "Th e doctrine of the self in St. Augustine and in Descartes" (Kehr 1916 ).
In general, the notion of the self means the knowledge of an individual about him-or herself acquired in the processes of socialization on the basis of what has been thematized in biosemiotics as human primary modelling systems (cf. Sebeok, Danesi 2000) . In contemporary approaches, the fact that the self is a biological organism is regarded as a prerequisite for its mental development emerging through existential experiences in the reality of everyday life, made possible, precisely, on the basis of species-specifi c modelling devices. Th anks to these experiences, human beings as organisms go beyond their biological conditionings. As a matter of fact, perceptions, beliefs, and thoughts of an individual, for example, on self-assessment, or evaluations of him-or herself in relation to others are metasemiosic processes favoured by the syntactic nature of human modelling and occupy a signifi cant place in his/her mental life.
Because the self is a personal and subjective phenomenon, the identity of an individual as a unique and independent human being is formed as a result of one's sensory and conscious experiences in relation with the other. Except for diff erences between individuals, the impact of culture on the self-concept causes it to take shape in relation, inter alia, to cultural surroundings. At any rate, the self, in other words, the structure and contents of the emotional-intellectual experiences of an individual, emerges from interpersonal communication in changeable social and cultural contexts. One can thus say that the unique single self develops and is in becoming in relation with the other and its environment. As stated, among others, by Cliff ord Geertz (1973: 52) , humans as particular individuals are beings who give form, order, purpose and direction to their lives in terms of cultural patterns and systems of meaning which are created historically. Th us, while most of the self 's properties develop in communicative interactions with the other, only some of them can be recognized as universal. In the light of arguments presented from the point of view of social and cultural psychology, for example, by Hasel Rose Markus and Shinobu Kitayama (Markus, Kitayama 1991: 225-231) , it can be clearly concluded that diff erent shapes of the self are considered to be characteristic of diff erent cultures.
Th e psychic properties of the human self embedded in culture and society do not only cause particular individuals to understand other individuals through messages dependent upon communicative situations or circumstances that accompany them. As a matter of fact, humans also possess a disposition to take appropriate action towards objects about which they have some knowledge. Th erefore, representatives of social psychology, e.g., Douglas T. Kenrick, Steven L. Neuberg, and Robert B. Cialdini (1999) , who devote their attention to problems of social cognition and motivation determining the behaviour of humans, do not dispense with the notion of the self. Th ey analyse and explain cases of mutual encounters among unique individual selves, which consist in infl uencing others, for example, by persuasion and manipulation, leading to social affi liation, friendship and cooperation, or by prejudice and stereotypes, amounting to confl icts, discrimination, aggression, violence, etc. Moreover, based on the practice of everyday life social psychologists uncover a large diff erentiation among individuals at the levels of both their psyche and behaviour. Th eir observations also point to the existence of inconsistencies in what participants in social interaction believe and say, as well as what they ultimately do.
Assuming that the interpretation of meaning ascribed to communicative means by some communicating individuals is performed in the logical domain by other individuals as communication participants or by researchers as external observers studying human communication, it would be appropriate to explain the psychological mechanisms which accompany the formation of linguistic expressions. At this point, the depiction of the human self as described by a Polish representative of linguistic pragmatics and sociolinguistics Roman Kopytko (2002: 117-121 ) is worthy of attention of specialists who deal with meaning, understanding and interpretative activities of humans (cf. also Kopytko 2003) . Having summarized the previous knowledge of mental aspects of man for the needs of linguistic-pragmatic studies, Kopytko emphasizes that the self is responsible for the organization of data coming from experiences, for the maintenance of self-esteem, and for striking the balance between pleasure and pain in the life of an individual. Kopytko's primary conclusion, drawn in compliance with Tory E. Higgins' understanding of the self (cf. Higgins 1987) , is that an individual's self-awareness, which determines his or her current linguistic performances, constitutes in qualitative terms, at each instance, the result of how the cognitive-aff ective-conative system works. Strictly speaking, awareness of the self and others is dependent on the mutual interaction between the three domains of the self: (1) the actual self, primarily governed by the cognitive system, constituting in fact the conceptual awareness of the self; (2) the ought self; and (3) the ideal self. Both the ought self and the ideal self infl uence the actual self which, however, is governed by the aff ective and conative systems as well. Th is is because all three parts of the self, the actual, the ought and the ideal, appear together in diff erent combinations and at diff erent levels in any instance and are responsible for the cognitive processes and communicative activity of the individual. Th ese parts or components of the self jointly contribute to the development of the human ability to think by means of internal signs processed in intrapersonal communication and, in the same measure, they determine the process of using their external counterparts transmitted and received in interpersonal communication.
In reference to the foregoing discussion, being assured that knowledge, emotions, and will take part in the selection of linguistic and semiotic signs for the creation of communicatively relevant meanings, special importance has to be attached to the distinction between the observable self and the inferable self. As stated earlier, this distinction suggests that the communicating self is engaged as a person in the experiential acts of transmitting and receiving verbal signs in the physical domain, and, at the same time, is occupied as a mental subject with the intellectual acts of processing and interpreting the meanings of verbal and non-verbal signs in the logical domain.
Observable and inferable properties of the self in the physical and logical domains of the human life-world
Th e life-world of humans, a world that the individual selves must experience collectively, was defi ned by creators and advocates of the idea of the phenomenological notion of intersubjectivity, in particular, by Edmund Husserl (cf. mainly his position expressed in Th e Crisis of European Sciences, Husserl 1970: 108-109, 133, 142 ; unfi nished in German and published in an English translation aft er the author's death). Alluding to Husserl's concept of the human life-world (Lebenswelt) -"In whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as coherent universe of existing objects, we, each 'I-the-man' and all of us together, belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this 'living together'" (Husserl 1970: 108) -one has to agree with the assumption of mundane phenomenology that, in the life history of individuals, there must be a shared background for experiencing all things and states of aff air which occur in reality. Moreover, one has to notice that this background must continuously change as a consequence of an ongoing communication between individuals; it must, however, be diff erent from the objective reality assumed to exist outside or around individuals.
Th ere can be no doubt that the human life-world, interpreted as the reality of everyday by social constructivists Peter Ludwig Berger and Th omas Luckmann (1966) , comes into being as a result of the communicative activity of humans, which is based, on the one hand, on the concrete transmission or exchange of material meaning bearers and, on the other hand, on the mental attainment or achievement of commonalities of meanings, pertaining to shared views, beliefs, ideas, knowledge, attitudes and/or values, etc., inferred from conceptual and propositional contents of interpreted and understood meaning bearers. Th is particular statement brings to mind or is tantamount to the already mentioned distinctions between the observable and inferable properties of the selves as communication participants as well as between the interpersonal and intersubjective collectivities in human communication.
To continue this course of reasoning, it is necessary to explain the postulates addressed by Yngve (1996) to linguists, namely, that the object of empirical study should constitute not language but linguistic properties of individuals, who communicate with other individuals through the physical-acoustic communication channel, being available in the physical domain. However, despite Yngve's claim, one has to endorse the assertion that interpersonal communication takes place both in the physical and the logical domains.
Rectifying the idea put forward by Yngve (1996) that communication should be investigated exclusively in the physical domain within the framework of hard sciences, the view that people not only talk but also understand each other needs to be put forward. While the production of verbal means is a concrete act, comprehending them on the basis of concluded reality is a mental act. Th us, the physical domain unites speakers and listeners who communicate with each other through sound waves and other observable objects as parts of their surroundings which are relevant for the realization of their tasks. Hence, if communication consists in both an exchange of material meaning bearers and their interpretation by people, it must be studied along with the facts which belong both to the physical and the logical domains of human life-worlds. In these worlds of observable and inferable reality mediated by verbal signs, the human being as a bearer or user of language lives and reaches an agreement with others.
Bearing in mind the need for theoretical separation of two kinds of properties of the communicating selves, analogously to the two pairs of detached dimensions in the study of human communication, one has to speak in favour of investigating verbal and nonverbal signs as cognizable and associated phenomena which take place on two mutually concatenated planes, namely, the objective plane of expression and the objective, if observed, or subjective, if concluded, plane of reference. Hence, the products of verbal behaviour and the accompanying nonverbal behaviour appear as observable in the physical domain, when realized or codifi ed in such sensorially perceivable meaning bearers as speech-sound waves or their surrogates functioning in the context of paralinguistic and non-linguistic signs. Th eoreticians of communication, Michael Burgoon and Michael Ruff ner (1978: 130-146) have classifi ed such signs into movement, posture, gesture, facial expressions, eye contact, physical appearance (especially body shape, skin colour, texture, hair, clothing accessories, and cosmetics), touch, smell, artifacts, interpersonal distance, timing and sequencing of activities and statements. However, while being displaced in time and space, i.e., directly not observable here and now, the communicated objects of reference, along with the communicative aims, intentions or tasks realized by communicating individuals, belong to the logical domain as far as they can be only inferred on the basis of human conduct or its products. Th ey are only ascribed to particular communication participants by other communication participants. In the same manner, subjective mental states cannot be described in terms of physical phenomena even though conscious activity operates within the brain that is a physical organ. Th us, when examining the properties of communicating selves, the researcher is faced with the necessity to account for data which are accessible to empirical observations with the aim to assess interpersonal relationships as well as to cognize and to interpret the meaning of verbal messages in an attempt to infer about intersubjective relationships linking participants of communication (on the investigative consequences of the distinction between the physical and logical domains of communication, see Wąsik 2010 against the background of Yngve 1996).
The polyglot individual in a text-and role-oriented typology of the human selves
If the capacity of acquiring natural languages is the fi rst and most basic among human aptitudes responsible for the signifi cative and communicative activity of human individuals, communicating selves are to be considered as polyglot selves. Humans as communicators, who possess the ability to know many languages as one of their heteronomous dependences, should be considered in accordance with the assumption that, becoming or being polyglot, they make choices between languages and language varieties in encounters with others, taking into account the social and situational communication circumstances.
glôtta 'tongue') refers to a human individual who speaks, writes, or reads several languages (cf. Random House 1997 [1992 ). It remains in close semantic relations with the notion of multilingualism (or also bilingualism) used with reference to individuals being profi cient in more than only one language, and defi ned in the fi rst place by linguists, researchers of language contacts or anthropologists, as Leonard Bloomfi eld (1933: 55-56), Uriel Weinreich (1953: 1) , Einar Ingvald Haugen (1953: 6-7) , and A. Richard Diebold, Jr. (1961: 99) . However, the use of notions such as bilingualism and multilingualism, or bilingual and multilingual, as applied currently in foreign language teaching, is not restricted to referring to individuals characterized by a perfect fl uency in (a) foreign language(s). On the contrary, diff erent kinds of polyglottism or multilingualism, dependent on the degree individuals master particular languages and the extent to which they use them, are distinguished by, e.g., Hugo Baetens Beardsmore (1982: 1-36) , Josiane F. Hamers and Michel H. A. Blanc (2000[1983] : 6-27), Bee Chin Ng and Gillian Wigglesworth (2007: 6-17) ; works of these authors give a certain idea of linguistic conditionings of human individuals as selves communicating in natural languages. First of all, as one might conclude from descriptions of multilinguals, formulated mainly for the needs of foreign language instructors who are interested in developing the linguistic competences of their students, humans really neither learn particular languages simultaneously since early childhood nor use them as entirely equivalent means of communication. Th ey rather acquire particular languages in diff erent periods of their life, in diff erent environmental conditions, with diff erent motivation, which, in turn, results in diff erent cognitive eff ects, non-equal competence in particular language skills, and thus in a non-uniform deployment of languages in diff erent situations. In addition, individuals rarely master and use languages of equal status, that is, they oft en speak dialects or other non-standard varieties. What is important, an acquisition of each language leads to the adoption of a new cultural identity, so that multilingual individuals Th e term polyglot (derived from the Greek polyglôttos 'many-tongued' , combining the stems polys 'much' or 'many' and glôttos 'tongued' , which is an adnominal adjective of seldom appear to be monocultural. As it follows from investigations pertaining to the acquisition, knowledge and use of two or more languages, there are both quantitative and qualitative diff erences between linguistic performances of particular individuals. In general, the regularity can be observed that the more complex the mechanisms involved in language learning, the more compound the cognitive processes taking place in the mind of an individual turn out to be. A linguist who deals with texts spoken and written by bi-or multilingual individuals pays attention to tendencies of their producers toward code-switching and interlingual borrowings, as well as language transfers and cross-linguistic interferences.
According to some researchers of multilingualism, multilingual and multicultural competence (see, e.g., Cook 2002), the acquisition of two or many languages is discussed in terms of the development of language competence which is not twofold or multiple, but rather multidimensional. For instance, in the opinion of Francois Grosjean, a Swiss psycholinguist, bilinguals always blend competencies in two languages. Th erefore, these kind of communicators must be characterized as speakers and listeners who in no case can be treated as the sum of two monolinguals but rather, or most of all, as exclusively integrated wholes consisting of unique and specifi c persons and subjects of communication (cf. especially Grosjean 2008: 13-14) .
Observations pertaining to psychological and societal reasons of multilingualism as a widespread property of human individuals and to diff erent forms and ways of its manifestation may constitute a point of reference for refl ections about the self in communication in general. At this point, for example, Grosjean's arguments presented in his books with characteristic titles, such as Life with Two Languages (1982) and Bilingual: Life and Reality (2010), turn out to be useful. He is convinced that it is an understatement or an oversimplifi cation to maintain that bilinguals are distinguished just by the fact that they regularly use two or more languages in their everyday life. As a psychologist, Grosjean proves empirically that bilinguals speak two languages which for them constitute a certain linguistic continuum, together or separately, depending on their goals and aims realized in encounters with diff erent people in diff erent domains of life.
Th e notion of the language mode introduced by Grosjean in his article "Th e bilingual's language modes" (2001) is also important. Th e article aims to show that it is the specifi city of social situations in the everyday life of bilingual individuals, understood by them subjectively, which induces them to undertake particular manners of verbal behaviour. Literally, Grosjean (e.g., 2008: 36) has defi ned the language mode as the state of activation of the bilingual's languages and language processing mechanisms at a given point in time. In his opinion, it has a decisive impact on the everyday behaviour of the bilingual. In particular, interferences may occur in the monolingual language mode, while the bilingual mode is characterized by the appearance of such forms of mixing as codeswitching and borrowing. Th e concept of language mode indicates unconscious and conscious mixing of languages resulting in interference, code-switching, borrowing, etc. It allows assessing bilingual individuals according to whether they are acquiring a new language or losing one, or whether their bilingualism remains stable or not, etc. In sum, since diff erent aspects of life of an individual require diff erent languages, his or her linguistic knowledge, including the knowledge of vocabulary, does change over time, but probably not at the same pace for the so-called stable and unstable bilinguals. Being aware of the psychological aspects of language processing mechanisms, one has to conclude that, from a sociological point of view, the choice of a language by communicators (i.e., a particular natural language or a language variety) depends on the need for that language and is, in sociolinguistic terms, domain specifi c.
Human individuals are not infrequently bi-or multilingual in the literal sense. In everyday life, knowers and users of natural languages, language varieties, and also of a number of other semiotic codes may be considered as polyglot selves. All communicative performances of humans could be considered as governed by communication modes between which they must move as external conditionings and states of their mind change. As one might suppose, principles according to which participants in interpersonal communication switch into modes directing their verbal and nonverbal behaviour when they adjust to situations and persons with whom they interact must be similar to mechanisms directing the language modes of bi-or multilinguals. It can be even assumed that motives as well as goals and intentions of human individuals can be deduced by their conversation partners being aware of the changeability of the mental states of others which cause them not only to use diff erent languages or language varieties, i.e., dialects, stylistic or functional varieties, jargons or slangs, etc., but also to choose between modes of speaking and/or to resort to varied means of signifi cation and communication. And fi nally, the communicative properties of the selves manifested, for example, in codeswitching come under scrutiny in the physical domain, while, for example, the identity of an individual expressed by switching between two or more languages or language varieties should be investigated and described in the logical domain.
As far as the communicative repertoires of particular individuals are concerned, verbal and nonverbal means which are internalized by particular individuals in their cultures and used depending on with whom, when, and why they communicate, e.g., words and phrases, set expressions in natural languages they prefer, etc., change over time, because the social environment as well as needs and values of individuals change. Exposing the notion of the polyglot self in the context of semiotic and cultural studies, one has to highlight the impossibility of describing the total communicative repertoire of an individual. In addition, attention should be paid to the idea of cultural polyglotism with reference to the notion of 'cultural text' introduced by Juri Lotman, the founder of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics, inaugurated in 1964 (for details see Kull et al. 2011) , which became famous aft er the translation into several languages of "Th eses on the semiotic study of cultures (as applied to Slavic texts)" (Uspensky et al. 1973) , and his further related articles (cf. Lotman 1973, as well as Lotman 1974 Lotman , 1988 Lotman [1981 Lotman ], 1994 Lotman [1981 ).
In view of the fact that the communicating selves who have at their disposal cultural languages as sign systems are the true agents in human communication, and that their communicative properties constantly change depending on multifarious social and cultural conditionings, the importance of the context(s) in which verbal texts are produced and interpreted should be recognized. Nevertheless, being aware of the psychological mechanisms according to which signs arise in the minds of human individuals, researchers who investigate linguistic texts as products of the sign-communicational activity of the human selves can never be sure whether their knowledge of the (external) context is suffi cient.
However, if language is treated as a human-related semiotic fact belonging to the phenomenal life-world, its individual speakers and listeners can be considered as manifestations of various types of the selves. As communication participants, they act verbally and nonverbally throughout their lives, presumably depending on how their cognitive-aff ective-conative systems operate within their minds because they are able to create utterances according to patterns delivered by their languages and cultures from which they make choices individually. In order to create a typology of the selves that might be deduced from spoken and written texts which characterize the social roles and pragmatic goals of communication participants in various domains of the human life-world, researchers must accept temporary and long-lasting psychological and cultural conditionings of humans as classifi catory criteria. Moreover, assuming that the communicating selves act as persons and subjects in both interpersonal and intersubjective collectivities, they could eventually prove or infer which parts of their inner selves become manifested, in a linguistic and non-linguistic manner, at a particular moment. As stated above, it is possible to demonstrate empirically how individuals, communicating with each other, are bound by sound waves and other surrogate codes transmitted and received via communication channels, and that it is a matter of assumption how they interpret meaning bearers while making reference to a commonly known extra-linguistic reality in a similar way. Th us, the existence of linkages between the minds of individual communication participants is deducible from presupposition, intuition, reasoning and/or imagination.
Consequently, the following statements should be taken into consideration. It is thanks to the processes of interpersonal communication that the transition from selfawareness to identity takes place. Th e subjective mental image someone has of him-or herself as a person aff ects the ways he or she produces and understands verbal signs as meaning bearers. If the identity of individuals fi nds expression in externalized verbal texts (in lexical elements and grammatical forms, characteristic of languages they speak) similarly to other products of their activity, parts of the cognitive self can be read from the properties of the communicating individual (from the preferred words and expressions he or she utters or writes and the presumed ways of their interpretation). Th ereby, the process of identifi cation must proceed at the level of the individual's cognitive system. Th e individual's knowledge pertaining to him-or herself and others comes from sensory experience and must be conscious, which means that, before expressing it verbally, people must fi rst know or be convinced which information they gain from their senses, whether they have positive or negative sensations and feelings, whether they act or have desires, wills, or wishes. In a typological survey of selves, all components of the human self in general, such as the material self, the social self, the spiritual self, the remembering self and the imaginative self, as well as the emotional self in particular, must be subsumed under the capacities of the cognitive self. It is so, because the cognitive self is the knower of its body, its properties and states, its possessions and other persons, such as its near relatives, its states of mind and thoughts. It has views, ideas, beliefs, attitudes, etc., of the self and others and toward the self and others; moreover, it is the knower of facts, views, beliefs, and attitudes that the others possess. As a matter of fact, when humans talk about feelings or acts of will, they are really talking about their own thoughts, about their feelings and acts of will. Since semiotic systems available to human individuals impose certain categories on the world perceived by them, the notion of the categorical self must be equal to that of the cognitive self. Furthermore, feelings and inclinations, which are not verbalized, remain unconscious, but they are driving forces of the self as well. Hence, the understanding of the cognitive self must be supplemented with the aff ective and the conative parts of the self, if impulses coming, for example, from body language are translated into natural language(s).
Among diff erent parts of the cognitive self, the concept of the social self (understood as the interpersonal or collective self) deserves closer attention. Th e self in general develops when a human individual is appreciated, recognized or respected by others. Th e social self thus refl ects the membership of an individual in social groups. Communication participants, owing to social encounters, usually learn to feel solidarity with groups or believe in their particular status. Examples of the social selves, the number of which can be practically unlimited, may be derived from the sense of their belonging to ethnic, professional or age groups, groups of people who are bound together by their place of origin or residence, or by common interests, gender groups, etc.
However, humans as beings endowed with reason (homo animal rationale) can be above all estimated and understood in terms of the true or rational selves responsible for resolute endeavours to improve their personalities by striving for their moral improvement. Th eir dilemmas come down to fi nding a middle road between bodily needs and pleasures on the one hand, and values and commitments resulting from the fact of belonging to groups of diff erent kind and cultural requirements on the other hand. In connection with the questions of self-esteem, self-acceptance or self-affi rmation bothering individuals, the notions of the real self, the ideal self, the normative self, the deceptive self, the pragmatic self, the ironic self must also be added.
In sum, however, aspects and constituents of the self in general can be deduced from the verbal and non-verbal behaviour of human communicators who, while sharing their life-world with others, undoubtedly exhibit the properties of polyglotism. Th ese properties can be revealed under the condition that, each time, suitable criterions will be elaborated with reference to the social and cultural contexts. One has to recognize the importance of the situational and cultural context(s) in which verbal texts are produced and interpreted. Texts refl ect various types of interpersonal relationships ascertainable in social reality.
Researchers who look for linguistic-communicational properties of people in the domain of task-and-means-oriented dialogical texts, usually start from the properties of the communicating selves, go through the observable elements making up various kinds of temporary and long-lasting collectivities, and end with the aggregation of the chains of communication participants in the structure of human society. With a view to the self engaged in communication, using natural languages and other systems of signifi cation to convey meanings to others, it has to be stated that diff erent individuals, having the same verbal devices at their disposal, do not use them in exactly the same way because of specifi c, internal, or psychological contexts which constitute the source, i.e., an underlying cause of changes in the universe of meaning.
The semiotic existence mode of the intraorganismic self
By way of conclusion, subjectivity of verbal signs which come into being in the minds of human individuals should be exposed against the background of research on language as a property of communicating individuals. As a matter of fact, language-, cultureand organism-oriented studies in the post-structuralist period of linguistics and semiotics concentrate essentially on issues of multilingualism, multidiscursivism and multiculturalism in the context of interpersonal and global communication, mutual understanding and misunderstanding. Ultimately, it is the texts embedded in the social and cultural relations, discursive practices, speech acts, speech genres, on a par with communicative events, dialogical utterances, conversations, etc., which have become the object of linguistic studies. In fact, contemporary scholars who search for communication patterns of groups derive their methodology from the domain of the ethnography of communication, whose basic terms, concepts and issues have been defi ned by Muriel Saville-Troike (1982: 12-50) . In her work, linguists are seen in the broadest sense as language-and culture-oriented researchers who are faced with the need to interpret multi-layered utterances which depend on personal, social and historical experiences of communication participants. In another fi eld of study, those who utilize the achievements of cognitive linguistics tend to present the individual's knowledge of the world in the form of mental refl ections of concepts included in propositional contents of verbal utterances, and preserved in the social meanings of linguistic entities, units and constructions. In this way, scholars who, unlike the supporters of mentalist constructivism, see the cause of cognitive processes in the ability of an organism to interact with its environment, tend to follow the idea of enactionism having its roots in the biological conceptions of Humberto R. Maturana, Francisco J. Varela (cf., e.g., Maturana, Varela 1980 , 1987 , Evan Th omson, and Eleanor Rosch, and developed, inter alia, in Anthropological Linguistics by William A. Foley (1997: 8-11) . With regard to theoretical foundations of embodied semantics, they claim that human individuals as biological organisms cognize the reality through their senses only; hence, there is no objective meaning, but the meaning is rather embedded in their lived histories.
Currently, language is studied, following the postmodern trends, alongside with issues of ideology, values, ethics, and subjective needs realized through verbal understanding in spoken and written communication. Th erefore, further refl ections pertaining to human individuals as signifying and communicating subjects in their personal and cultural conditionings come to the fore. Particularly, the semiotic nature of the human self deserves special attention of contemporary practitioners of language sciences. Th is postulate entails detaching the mental subject whose intellectual properties are assumed only from the concrete, real person who is observed in the communication "theatre" of everyday life. Th e inner self as a mental subject is engaged in activities of sign-processing and sign-understanding, yet the outer self as a concrete person is the transmitter and receiver of signs.
In relation to the concepts of the self and subjectivity, the investigative framework of existential semiotics elaborated by Eero Tarasti is worth separate mentioning. Inspired by idealistic philosophers who dealt with the alterity of the ego or otherness in terms of transcendence, the Finnish semiotician and philosopher considers the human body to be the carrier of personal properties and the material basis for semiotic processes of the mental subject who copes with his or her being in the world through rational acts in the consciousness. He formulated his human centered conception of the object of neosemiotics at the 9th Congress of the IASS/AIS (Helsinki-Imatra, 11-17 June 2007), and thoroughly extended it in an entry to Th e Oxford Handbook of Culture and Psychology (cf. Tarasti 2009 : 1755 -1772 .
Having developed the foundations of his theory, Eero Tarasti departs from two existential categories of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1910 Hegel ( [1807 ), namely, an-sich-sein 'being-in-itself ' and für-sich-sein 'being-for-itself ' , enriching them with two additional distinctions, an-mir-sein 'being-in-myself ' and für-mich-sein 'being-formyself ' , aft er the terminological modifi cation in French (être-en-moi -être-en-soi vs. être-pour-moi -être-pour-soi) proposed by Jacques Fontanille (2004: 22-23) , while listing such four forms of being, in other words, the existence modes of the self in consistency with the understanding specifi ed above, as (1) being-in-myself -an-mir-sein -être-en-moi -the bodily ego of the self manifested in its appearance and performance; (2) being-for-myself -für-mich-sein -être-pour-moi -the awareness of the self as an observer shift ing to possible acts of transcendence; (3) being-in-itself -an-sich-sein -être-en-soithe cultural-normative potentialities of the self; and (4) being-for-itself -für-sich-sein -être-pour-soi -the role-oriented realization of the self in society and culture.
Against the background of experiential states of the self, known from communication theory, such as: 'the real self ' , 'the self 's self ' , 'the other's self ' , and 'the self 's' other's self ' (cf. Burgoon, Ruff ner 1978) , the acts of transcendence distinguished by Tarasti, in which the individual subject is not satisfi ed with his or her universe of being, can be analysed in the following order -fi rstly, the inner pressure of movement; secondly, the possibility of acting; thirdly, the inner determination to act; and fi nally, the power of intellectual eff ort of being acquainted with. Th ese four existence modes, expressed through particular verbs, such as 'will' , 'can' , 'must' , and 'know' , may run or pass through the mental operations of individual and social parts of human individuals as well (cf. Tarasti 2009 Tarasti : 1763 Tarasti -1766 Tarasti , and 2011 .
It is obvious therefore that the contents of the individual part of the self are transformed within the organism into the social part of the self as soon as he or she starts to interact with others. External observers may notice here that human beings as private selves do not communicate with one another directly, but it is rather their social part determined by group affi liation and cultural experiences which is engaged in communication. Hence, a conclusion can be drawn that the existence of human beings -who are active in various pragmatic spheres of language-and culture-in-use and who thus become polyglot in their life-worlds -is enabled through the semiotic means, which facilitate their individual thinking and reasoning as well as their mutual understanding in society. While paraphrasing the metaphor of polyglotism, applied to culture as a system of "texts", one could fi nally state that the communicating self as a "cultural polyglot" must be able to cope with texts coming from diff erent cultures, i.e., he or she must know how to communicate in and understand the multiplicity of cultural languages. All in all, the knowers of diff erent languages and cultures might be described as possessing interlingual and intercultural competences.
need, kes töötlevad ja mõistavad arusaadavaid tähenduskandjaid, seostades neid keelevälise tegelikkusega arutlemis-ja tõlgendamisaktide kaudu. Vaadeldes polüglotismi mõistet, väidab artikkel, et on võimalik Isede mitmeaspektiline tüpoloogia keeleliste ja kultuuriliste tekstide põhjal, mis iseloomustavad kommunikatsoonis osalejate sotsiaalseid rolle ja pragmaatilisi eesmärke inimeste elumaailma erinevates valdkondades. Lõpus toetab artikkel veendumust, et keele ja kultuuri vahelist vastastiksõltuvust tuleb peamiselt seletada inimeste psühholoogilise või pigem psühhosemiootilise tingituse terminites. Et konkreetsed keeled on ühiskondliku ja kultuurilise elu saadused ja koostisosad, mis on tänu inimeste isiklikule ja subjektiivsele tegevusele pidevalt kujunemises ja muutumises, viitab polüglotism nii mitmekeelsuse kui ka mitmekultuursusena vajadusele uurida nende multikultuurset kompetentsi ja multikultuurset identiteeti.
